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Abstract—The widespread usage of new user tracking 
methods, i.e. web-based fingerprinting, is becoming a serious 
privacy concern as third parties try to track users across 
different websites. Meanwhile, it is usually difficult or impossible 
for users to opt-out fingerprinting if they want to fully benefit the 
services provided by the application or website.  Several studies 
tried to address the privacy issue in browser fingerprinting, 
mostly by faking attribute values. However, such configuration 
spoofing may lead to inconsistencies that paradoxically make the 
user stand out even more. This study analyzes these paradoxes in 
browser configuration with the creation of a Markov model 
based on a test dataset. Given a target spoofed attribute, the 
implemented tool in this study outputs the other attributes that 
must be consequently altered, not to cause paradoxical 
configuration. Similarly, this tool can suggest a set of random 
attributes to be spoofed with suggested values, not creating a 
paradoxical configuration. The tool Implemented in this study 
can be used by browser extension developers and should help 
them spoof browser attributes more sophistically, thus preserving 
users' privacy against cross-site web-based browser 
fingerprinting. 
I.INTRODUCTION
Cookie is the asset for storing information 
corresponding to session state, e.g. user’s personal 
configurations as well as private data, on client device. The 
main purpose for cookies is to identify users and track their 
past activities on a website for their convenience and rapidity 
of access. Due to the functional nature of cookies, it is 
always a privacy and security concern in modern web 
browsers and so it is possible to disable cookies. 
Nevertheless, a new method of tracking users was recently 
proposed by anti-fraud and advertising companies which 
employs fingerprinting.  
As the large-scale experiments conducted in [1], [2] 
shows, web-based fingerprinting is a serious privacy 
concern. There are two main reasons behind the motivation 
for device fingerprinting:  
Third-party tracking, i.e. tracking users across unrelated 
websites to build up a user profile allowing efficient and 
accurate advertisement targeting. Fraud prevention, i.e. web-
based fingerprinting is a powerful tool for finding related 
transaction. The gathered database can be used to blacklist 
fraudulent users. Moreover, illegal sharing of accounts can 
be detected using fingerprinting.  
The fingerprint of a device is a combination of system 
attributes that can be queried and accessed from the browser. 
This combination has usually a high likelihood to be unique 
and therefore can be used as a device identifier. A natural 
best practice for web-based fingerprinting is to select 
attributes based on their stability, i.e. attributes that seldom 
change or at least change very gradually. These attributes, 
generally collected via JavaScript, range over a broad set of 
values such as, the User agent header, the Accept header, the 
Connection header, the Encoding header, the Language 
header, the list of plugins, the platform, the cookies 
preferences (allowed or not), the Do Not Track preferences 
(yes, no or not communicated), the time zone, the screen 
resolution and its color depth, the use of local storage, the 
use of session storage, a picture rendered with the HTML 
Canvas element, a picture rendered with WebGL, the 
presence of AdBlock, and the list of fonts [1]. 
Although opting-out is possible from third-party 
fingerprinting services, there is indeed no guarantee for a 
successful opt-out. Even for giving the possibility of a 
successful out-out, the fingerprint needs to be computed 
anyway, assuming cookies are disabled and that the third-
party is honest. A common approach in building browser 
extensions for fingerprint opt-out is to induce a shared 
fingerprint, so that all the users with that fingerprint are not 
distinguishable [3].  
During the data gathering phase of Panopticlick 
project[1], Eckersley found that impossible configurations 
are reported by the browsers with spoofed configuration. For 
instance, such impossible configuration would be a device 
claiming to be an iPhone and supporting flash plug-ins at the 
same time. Using common browser features was shown to be 
effective in Eckersley’s study, therefore providing 
extensions to increase privacy added by users is reasonable. 
As a case study, members of a cybercriminal forum were 
advised to change user-agent by installing and utilizing an 
extension for anonymity [4].   
Nikiforakis et al. [5] analyzed the most popular browser 
extensions that are purposed to spoof user-agent. In their 
test, navigator and screen objects, as two most-probed 
objects by the fingerprinting libraries, were listed via 
JavaScript and subsequently compared with HTTP header 
sent with their request. Interestingly, they found that in all
cases, the true identity of the browser, inadequately hided by 
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the extension, is exposable through JavaScript 
straightforwardly and many of them were suffering from the 
impossible configuration issue. Particularly, they mention 
that none of the analyzed extensions try to modify the screen
object. Therefore, impossible screen resolution was reported 
by all the users who were browsing on a laptop or 
workstation and disguised it as a smartphone, e.g. 4k 
resolution on an iPhone.  
In this work, we address impossible configurations, i.e. 
paradoxes in the configuration resulted from alteration of 
browser extensions. A dependency model of the browser 
features is created based on the attributes that are used for 
device fingerprinting. This Markov chain model implicitly 
contains the dependencies between the attributes by simple 
terms of probabilities. Hence, this Markov model reveals 
two facts about the afore-mentioned paradoxical example. 
First, it highlights that alterations of user-agent must be 
followed by changing the display resolution. Second, a 
possible screen resolution that matches the chosen user-
agent, e.g. 750x1334, is recommended to the developer. 
Consequently, web-based device Fingerprinting 
countermeasures can follow this model to report consistent 
spoofed features. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the 
related studies and configuration spoofing tools and 
extensions are presented. This is followed by the 
methodology and subsequent results of the study. The 
evaluation of the current tool is finally presented in the last 
section. 
II. RELATED WORKS
Since the main purpose of this study is to help to build 
a successful countermeasure to device-fingerprinting, the 
related works presented in this section are focused on 
countermeasures. Moreover, web-based device 
fingerprinting was presented in introduction.  
Many browser plugins are developed with the main 
goal of stopping trackers, e.g. Ghostery, AVG Do Not Track, 
User-Agent Switcher for Chrome, etc. Main academic 
fingerprinting countermeasure studies includes FireGloves 
[6], ShareMeNot [7], PriVaricator [8]. The defense of some 
of these works are based on blacklisting the trackers. This 
approach is not much effective for two reasons: first, not all 
trackers are covered in black listing, second, some trackers 
can try to obfuscate their scripts, bypassing the blacklisting 
filter. Similarly for heuristically updated blacklist, any new 
tracker that implements a method that is not covered by that 
particular heuristic may not be noticed, as presented in [9], 
Mowery et al. describe how to use the blacklist content itself 
as an additional fingerprinting element.  
Other works, e.g. FireGloves, User-Agent Switcher for 
Chrome, and PriVaricator, try to fake the attributes which as 
pointed out in [1], [5], usually lead to inconsistencies and 
paradoxes that make the user stand out even more. This 
corresponds to the issue addressed in this study. This case is 
specifically examined in [10] for browsers employing 
FireGloves. Nikiforakis et al. [5] suggest not to use any user-
agent-spoofing browser extension but this is in our opinion 
rather extreme and the following section presents our 
method allowing the use of spoofing without inducing 
paradoxes. 
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The dataset analyzed in this study is a MySQL database 
provided by AmIUnique fingerprinting project website 
(www.AmIUnique.org). This dataset has 16000 records 
containing over 30 fingerprinting attributes for the devices 
fingerprinted during March 2017, including id, addressHttp, 
time, acceptHttp, hostHttp, userAgentHttp, pluginsJS, 
connectionHttp, encodingHttp, languageHttp, orderHttp, 
platformJS, cookiesJS, fontsFlash, IEDataJS, timezoneJS, 
resolutionJS, localJS, sessionJS, resolutionFlash, 
rendererWebGLJS, webGLJs, languageFlash, platformFlash, 
adBlock, octaneScore, sunspiderTime, pluginsJSHashed, 
dntJS, canvasJSHashed, webGLJsHashed, and 
fontsFlashHashed. The analysis of this dataset is 
implemented in python.  
To model the dependency in the fingerprinting 
attributes, a Markov model of the data was first created in 
the learning phase, which is saved as a python dictionary in a 
pickle object for further use. During the learning phase, first, 
each of the n columns of the dataset was analyzed separately 
and possible unique values were find.  
In the next step, with respect to rows containing each of 
the unique values, all the remaining n-1 columns where 
analyzed to find the values that are possibly linked with 
them. However, two main issues remain with this approach. 
First, this task can be extremely resource intensive (NP hard) 
and optimization of some sort is required. Second, the model 
follows a n-factorial nested loop as, for instance, for every 
variable in any of the n-1 columns that were previously 
bound to the unique variables of the first column, the same 
process should be repeated for values of the other n-2 
columns and so on.  
The former issue is caused by the fact that there might 
be many rows in data that are unique. These unique rows are 
not useful for our model for two reasons. First, since these 
rows are unique, the Markov chain will eventually contain 
nodes that are very unlikely to happen and this is counter 
intuitive for this work since the goal is to generate a 
reasonable and at the same time generic configuration of 
attributes. Second, while not useful, these rows significantly 
decrease the performance of the model.   
To address the first issue, a frequency threshold value 
was defined during modeling. This value defines the 
minimum frequency of each of the values for a particular 
column. In implementation of this study, this frequency 
threshold was set to 30. In other words, there must be at least 
30 instances of a particular value for an attribute to be 
considered and consequently saved as part of this model. 
Frequency threshold will inevitably cause skipping several 
records with lower frequencies. Therefore, the sum of final 
probabilities of possible values of an attribute might not sum 
up to 100%. The probabilities of values therefore had to be 
normalized to overcome this issue.  
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Regarding the second issue, i.e. repeating the process n! 
times, intuitively the model depth should be increased for the 
model to be more precise. However, the main objective of 
this work is not to generate a detailed and accurate model, 
but to generate a generic and reasonable one. Hence, the 
depth of the model was set to 2 and the first layer would 
again be used as the farther depths. This way, the method 
will still be realistic while increasing the performance. 
Another major parameter that was applied on the 
method was dependency threshold. This parameter was 
applied and used after building the model during the data 
extraction phase. Suppose the goal is to determine whether 
for a value V1, from attribute A1, there is any variable V2 
from attribute A2 that is dependent to it. This dependency, if 
exists and not addressed, will still cause the reporting of a 
near-unique attribute in system's configurations. To 
determine the dependency, the probabilities of all possible 
values of V2 will be considered and compared with 
dependency threshold. If the probability is higher than the 
dependency threshold, variables V1 and V2 will be 
considered as dependent.  
The implemented tool can also recommend a set of 
configuration changes that cause a reasonable spoofing. This 
task is achieved by walking on the Markov model. As a 
change in an attribute's value might lead to a paradox in 
another attribute, for each change, the consistency of other 
attributes is examined and indirect paradoxical attributes are 
determined and reported with suggested values for further 
spoofing.  
IV. RESULTS
Fig. 1 illustrates two spoofing: suppose a user intends 
to spoof the platformJS attribute to hide his browser's real 
fingerprint. By changing the platformJS to windows (Fig. 1
left), we notice that the fontFlash should also change to 
either of Flash Detected But Not Activated (Click-to-play),
and Flash Not Detected. Any value except these values is a 
paradox in browser's configuration. In the second example 
(Fig. 1 right), the platformJS is spoofed to iPad. Clearly, 
iPad's browser does not support flash and this was one of the 
paradoxes that was presented in [5] and here we see that with 
a probability of 100%, both the resolutionJS and fontFlash 
must be changed to 768x1024x32 and Flash Not Detected 
respectively.  
In a similar manner, this tool can recommend a reasonable 
configuration for spoofing. Recommended configuration has 
some direct attributes and few indirect ones. Listing 1 
illustrates an example of such configuration. In this listing, 
some of the parameters are left without recommended 
values. This is due to building up the model based on a small 
dataset of 16000 records for over 30 attributes. Hence, we 
assume that training the program with a larger dataset would 
fix this issue. This issue can also be fixed by reducing the 
frequency threshold followed by a performance decrease in 
learning phase.  
VI. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, an analysis of the paradoxes in web-
browser fingerprinting countermeasure was presented. A 
Fig. 1. example of spoofing the platformJS attribute to values would/would not cause paradox. Left: changing the value of platformJS to windows allows two 
choices for fontFlash attribute. Right: changing the value of platformJS to iPad, one must change the resolutionS and fontsFlash to 768x1024x32 and Flash 
Not Detected respectively, otherwise it would cause a paradox.  
Listing 1. output of the program, recommending a 
configuration for spoofing 
Direct parameter: cookiesJS -> yes 
Direct parameter: IEDataJS -> no 
Direct parameter: connectionHttp -> close 
Direct parameter: sunspiderTime ->  
Direct parameter: sessionJS -> yes 
Direct parameter: vendorWebGLJS -> Microsoft 
Direct parameter: encodingHttp -> gzip, deflate 
Direct parameter: octaneScore ->  
Direct parameter: hostHttp -> amiunique-backend 
Direct parameter: localJS -> yes 
Direct parameter: platformJS -> Win32 
Indirect parameter: vendorWebGLJS -> adBlock -> no 
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spoofing-helper tool based on a Markov chain of a sample 
dataset was also implemented in python. This script can 
work on the two following modes. First, given a value for a 
particular attribute, it will inform the developer about the 
other attributes that must be changed for consistency. 
Second, the script can suggest a set of changes that if 
applied, can successfully spoof the configuration of the 
browser.   
The contribution of this work can be questioned by a 
high-security browser like TOR browser, that keeps the 
attribute of all its instances the same, hence making the 
fingerprinting ineffective. However, this only happens in 
ideal case where the users do not install any plugins and do 
not try to tweak the settings. Moreover, this strong privacy 
of TOR browser as a fingerprinting countermeasure comes at 
the expense of severe negative effect on usability and in 
many exceeds the use of non-oppressed users.  
Although this script is mainly purposed to be used as a 
complementary tool for spoofing against fingerprinting, it 
can also be used for detecting paradoxes as well. For 
instance, one can input this tool with a configuration of a 
browser, and by extracting the probability of its attributes 
given the value of others, the total probability of the 
configuration can be calculated. If the configuration lacks 
consistency and is naïvely spoofed, the paradoxes will cause 
the total probability to be zero. Of course, for the result to be 
accurate a large dataset is required that contains many of 
possible combinations of the attributes.  
As an interesting future work, the presented tool in this 
study can be extended and implemented as a browser 
extension which can re-identify the users who spoofed their 
configuration to avoid fingerprinting, i.e. linking a new 
fingerprint to an existing one due to lack of sufficient 
modification of the attributes. 
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